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EUROPEAN SOCIALISM. THE WESTERN ALLIANCE AND CENTRAL AMERICA: 
LOST (LATIN AMERICAN) ILLUSIONS? 
Carlos Rico F. 
1.- Introduction. 
The Central American crisis has become a particularly interesting 
terrain in which to analyze some of the "new realities" which characterize 
relations between the United States and other Western countries in the 
eighties. New realities indeed: an area of the world which until quite 
recently had such a low place in the agenda of international politics, 
U.S. foreign policy or even Interamerican relations that the Assistant 
Secretary of State for Latin American affairs in the early seventies 
devoted no more than 3% of his time to it1 used as a case study to 
characterize much wider changes. That this is even possible is a result, 
basically, of two developments. 
The first one is related precisely to the place which this area had in 
the context of international politics for most of this century as an 
almost undisputed North American preserve, in which other Western 
countries (with the exception of Britain's presence in Belize) had quite 
limited interests. Central America was not only the subregion of Latin 
America where the dominant presence of the United States was originally 
William D. Rogers, "U. S. behavior and European Apprehensions", in 
Joseph Cirincione (Ed.): Central America and the Western Alliance (New 
York: Holmes & Meier, 1985). 
established but also one of the first areas of the world in which 
Europeans accepted a leading role on the part of the emerging new world 
power. Thus, while the presence of European governments and non- 
governmental forces was quite open in South America during the interwar 
decades, the same was not the case in the isthmus, where the U.S. was able 
to develop an almost unchallenged presence even during its isolationist 
years. After the Second World War, while Latin America as a whole saw its 
international alternatives dwindle, Central America was confirmed as what 
I have called elsewhere an area of U.S. "hyperhegemony". 2 
The contrast between that reality and the present proliferation of 
international actors which, one way or another, have participated in the 
difficult process of transition launched by the 1979 triumph of the 
Sandinist Front of National Liberation in Nicaragua is indeed remarkable. 
And what makes this relevant to understand intra-West relations, in 
particular in the sphere of security perceptions, is the fact that among 
those new actors other Western governments, both from Europe and from 
Latin America have played important roles. 
The second development is in turn related to the direction that such 
new participation has taken. Both the governments of the largest Latin 
American governments and several Western European public and private 
forces have been openly critical of the policies pursued by the Reagan 
Carlos Rico F. "Common Concerns and National Interests: The 
Contadora Experience and the Prospects for Collective Security 
Arrangements in the Western Hemisphere", paper prepared for the World 
Peace Foundation's Project on Collective Security in the Western 
Hemisphere, 1987. 
Administration in the area, refusing to let the leadership role of the 
North Americans to be taken for granted. This has given rise to an 
interesting paradox in which at the same time that the U.S. government 
publicly bases its policy prescriptions to deal with the crisis on the 
defense of Western interests that it says are threatened by the Soviet 
Union and its allies, those other governments whose interests are also 
supposedly being defended refuse to share that perception of threat. In 
fact, those other Western countries seem to have some times perceived 
threats to their interests that emanates not from Soviet actions but from 
North American behavior in the area. 
From a Latin American perspective there are other reasons, not directly 
connected to the problem of security perceptions but equally compelling, 
to carefully examine the extent of European involvement in the Central 
American crisis. They are in turn related to the possibility of taking 
that crisis, for precisely the same reasons that I have already 
summarized, as an example of the more general trends towards a more 
policentric international order in which new alternatives may be open for 
them. Since at least the end of the sixties, most goverments of the 
region have attempted, with diverse results, to "break out" of the Western 
hemisphere and develop new alternatives which may increase their 
international bargaining power. 3 
Laurence Whitehead, "Debt, Diversification and Dependency: Latin 
America's International Political Relations", in Kevin Middlebrook and 
Carlos Rico (Ed.): The United States and Latin America in the 1980's: 
Contending Pers~ectives on a Decade of Crisis (Pittsburg: Pittsburgh 
University Press, 1986). 
These Latin American efforts to "diversify dependency" have been widely 
chronicled. Two limitations of most of this literature must be noted in 
connection to the topic of this essay. In the first place the emphasis has 
been usually put on their economic dimensions. Secondly, increases in 
contacts between the region and extra-hemispheric powers are usually seen 
as the result of Latin American initiatives. Important aspects of the 
problem are thus frequently overlooked. Such is the case of the political 
dimensions of such diversification, not only in terms of the posibilities 
for restricted political alliances with governments beyond the Western 
Hemisphere, but also in terms of the c'ontacts and mutual support which may 
be developed between different political forces of various Western 
countries. A second dimension not always adequately covered is related to 
the role that those alternative poles of relation, in this case the 
Europeans, may play (and have played in some instances) in the context of 
those efforts at rapprochement. 
This essay tries to look at European involvement in Latin American 
affairs and its implications for perceptions in the sphere of security by 
taking the Central American crisis as an example of the potential 
disagreements which may crop up among Western countries in that issue 
area. With this in mind I focus my attention on a set of European 
political actors which are, at the same time, squarely within the 
parameters of what we may define as "the West", and most likely to place a 
different emphasis in their examination of security related questions: 
European Social Democrats. In examining them I will concentrate most of my 
attention on the international forum in which they participate (the 
Socialist International) but I will also make some references to specific 
actions by national parties and even by governments in those cases where 
Socialist parties have been in power during the years of the Central 
American crisis. 
The basic theme to'be developed in this essay is centered around the 
expectations which the activism displayed by some of these forces awakened 
both in Europe and in Latin America in terms of its potential for creating 
a bridge between Latin American security perceptions and the key concerns 
shared in that issue-area by the main participants in the Western 
Alliance. 
I take three steps in presenting my argument. The first section of the 
essay recapitulates the main antecedents to the European socialist's 
involvement in the Central American sub-region and more generally in Latin 
American affairs. The next part of the paper summarizes the main reasons 
that account for the expectations that were raised as a result of that 
participation. The third one examines their role in the context of the 
Central American crisis, focusing on their disagreements with the Reagan 
Administration. Finally I present a preliminary evaluation of the present 
state of European social democratic activities in connection with the 
Central American crisis and the potential for some increased participation 
by them in other issue areas and other parts of the region. Thus, after 
devoting the body of the essay to recording the main reasons that may be 
given to justify the hopes raised by such increased activism in the area I 
concentrate my final considerations on the subsequent dampening of those 
expectations. 
2.- Euro~ean Socialist Parties and Latin America: From the Years of 
Solitude to Increased Attention in Times of Crisis. 
In a well known process which has its roots in the mid-nineteen century 
and in particular in the creation of the Second International in 1889, and 
its latter development, European political forces which posited socialism 
as their objective gradually became divided into two main currents. The 
communist movement, the first one of those tendencies, was increasingly 
perceived after the Russian Revolution of 1917 as closely tied to what was 
to become the main international competitor of the U.S. and as such 
attracted a fair deal of attention of students of international relations. 
The second current, social democracy, attracted less attention among 
I.R. scholars, in particular in the United States. It was formed by those 
political parties and movements which, in their original thinking, argued 
that socialism could be achieved through the reform of capitalism, and 
which placed high value in the preservation, and expansion, of the 
political achievements of liberal democracy. Gradually these forces came 
to emphasize the reform of existing social, economic and political 
structures rather than their radical transformation. 
Both of these movements developed international connections in other 
parts of the world. However, an interesting difference between them came 
to be apparent in the first decades of the XXth century in terms of their 
ability to take roots in the less developed areas of the planet. While 
communist ideology developed in parts of Asia and Latin America, social 
democracy remained as basically a European phenomenon in spite of the 
efforts of different metropolitan socialist parties to promote the 
creation of like-minded political movements in the European colonies of 
the day. 
This basic difference is particularly apparent in Latin America. 
According to one of the foremost historians of socialist thought, the 
region did not play an important role in any of the branches of the 
socialist movement at least until after the First World war However, by 
the second decade of this century several communist parties were active in 
the area. On the other hand, for most of this century there has been only 
a very small number of parties formally affiliated with those 
organizations in which social democrats have joined forces. The most 
prominent exceptions to this situation in the early decades of the century 
were the socialist parties of Argentina and Uruguay which, after 
participating in the activities of the Second International, maintained 
their limited connections with their European counterparts. Political 
forces from both Brazil and Chile sporadically participated in those 
international efforts. 5 
G.D.H. Cole: Historia del Pensamiento Socialista (Mkxico: Fondo de 
Cultura Econ6mica, 1974), Vol IV, p. 273. 
Ibid. 
The difficult period social democracy went through from the beginning 
of the First World War until the mid forties can be seen as one of the 
causes of that situation. The reorganization of the international social 
democratic movement that culminates in 1951 with the creation of the 
Socialist International prepared the ground for a new period of 
international activity by European social democratic parties, several of 
which came to power in their respective countries. Such potential, 
however, was not fully developed until some years latter. 
The attempt to find a "third way" between the dominant socioeconomic 
systems of the postwar world and the mixture of political liberalism, 
social and economic reformism and quite open anticomunism that 
characterized the early statements of principles of the organization had a 
double impact. They on the one hand alienated a good part of socialist 
forces in the world, which tended to perceive social democrats as too 
close to U.S. positions in the Cold War confrontation and, on the other, 
attracted the attention of several political forces in the underdeveloped 
areas of the world which were themselves trying to gain some distance from 
both superpowers. 
The force of this attraction and the priority that social democrats 
gave to expanding it were limited during the fifties and sixties, by three 
sets of factors: (a) the perceived alignment of European socialism behind 
the United States, (b) the position taken by several European socialist 
parties during the process of decolonization which dominated North-South 
relations during that period and (c) the fact that during those years the 
problems of European reconstruction were at the top of the list of 
priorities of most political forces in that area of the world. 
Two different developments took place as those limiting circumstances 
changed. In the first place, once decolonization was basically completed 
and the Cold War started to melt down the potential appeal of the key 
aspects of European social democratic thinking for other regions of the 
world became increasingly apparent. Secondly, as their economic woes 
lessened, the attention devoted by the Europeans to relations with 
countries of the underdeveloped world other than their own colonies 
increased. A happy coincidence of circumstances took place and the efforts 
formally introduced by the Socialist International to stop being only 
"western and whitew6 found a much better ground for expression under those 
conditions. In the next section of this essay I summarize some of the more 
particular reasons why European social democracy appealed to important 
segments of the Latin American political spectrum as a potential element 
in their international activities. At this point my interest is in 
recording the slow process of increased relations between European Social 
Democracy and Latin American political forces. 
The road to increased Latin American participation in social 
democratic international activities was long. Not only were there 
relatively few political forces in the region which openly shared the 
Karl-Ludwig ~ ~ n s c h e  and K. Lantermann: Historia de la 
Internacional Socialista (MBxico: Nueva Imagen, 1979). Pp. 190-191. Quoted 
in Felicity Williams: La Internacional Socialista v America Latina 
(MBxico: Universidad Autonoma Metropolitana-Azcapotzalco, 1984). P. 106. 
stated thinking of the movement but during the fifties and sixties 
European social democratic parties concentrated their limited efforts to 
develop a "Third World constituency", as I have already suggested, in 
their former colonies. Such efforts, on the other hand, were to bear very 
limited fruits, which in turn became one of the reasons for the attention 
paid to Latin America in later years. 
When the Socialist International was created in 1951 only two political 
parties of the region, again those of Argentina and Uruguay, were listed 
among its members. Jamaican socialists joined the International in 1952 
and in 1955 a Latin American Secretariat of the organization was 
established in monte vide^,^ in which the Chilean Popular Socialist Party 
also participated. Acording to Felicity Williams, in its first six years 
the Secretariat was "in touch" with Socialist parties of Brazil, Ecuador, 
Panama and Peru, Colombia's Popular Socialist Party, Cuba's socialist 
Federation and the 26th of July movement, Democratic Action in Venezuela, 
Costa Rica's National Liberation Party, Peru's APRA, Bolivia's MNR, 
Paraguay's Partido Revolucionario Febrerista, the United Front of the 
Dominican Republic, in exile, and diverse European exile communities in 
Mexico. 9 
All this, however, did not bring noticeable changes to a situation 
Felicity Williams op. cit. P. 90. 
Michael Lowy, "Trayectoria de la Internacional Socialista en 
America Latina", Cuadernos Politicos Num. 29. July- September 1981. 
Felicity Williams OD. cit. Pages 194-195. 
characterized by the almost total lack of interest on the part of the 
European socialist parties in relation to the 1954 coup in Guatemala and 
the denounced U.S. participation in that event.1° The Latin American 
Secretariat tried to steer a middle course between military dictatorships 
which in many cases were openly supported by the U.S. and the communist 
parties of the region whose militants were increasingly influenced by the 
example of the Cuban revolution after 1959. This was not easy in the 
context of the sixties, when the impact of the Cuban revolutionary 
process, on the one hand, and the commitment of many reformist forces to 
the U.S. sponsored Alliance for Progress, on the other, left a very 
limited space to social democrats who would emphasize a European 
connection. 
It is, however, in the context of the early sixties that political 
parties from four Latin American countries (Costa Rica, Paraguay, Peru and 
Venezuela) joined the International as observers, showing an increase in 
interest which led to the transformation of the Latin American Secretariat 
into a Liason Bureau in 1966. By the end of that decade Latin American 
parties linked to the organization constituted its second largest 
geographic component. 
It is during the late sixties that the increased attention paid by the 
European social democrats to relation with the developing world picks up 
speed. Several factors are involved in that change. A first element is the 
modified tone of international politics introduced by the German Federal 
lo Michael Lowy OD. cit. page 38. 
Republic's ostpolitik. In this sense a second element which it seems 
necessary to bring into the analysis is related to the resurgence of the 
German social democratic party in the politics of its own country in the 
last years of the sixties. 
Germany had two characteristics which helped it develop a leading role 
in the "Third World policiesw of the Socialist International. The first 
one was related to the key role that German socialists had played in the 
movement in the years when it was still a part of the Second 
International. This leading role was confirmed with the influential 
participation that the SPD had in the process of revising social 
democratic ideology in the early fifties. Its Bad Godesberg program, made 
public in 1951 was very influential in the process of recreation of the 
International during the same year. The second factor had to do with the 
lack of former colonial possessions- a characteristic they shared with 
their Northern European counterparts- which imposed relatively fewer 
constraints in their behavior in relation to that of countries such as 
France or Great Britain. 
The West Germans gave also several examples of the disagreements of 
important components of European social democratic parties with different 
aspects of U.S. foreign policy which were also to have an important role 
in their increased activism. Those disagreements, on the other hand, 
basically expressed concerns which were also relevant in other countries. 
Thus, the role that the German social democratic youth (the Jusos) played 
in prompting their party to a more activist role in "Third World affairs" 
was clearly influenced by an event which had an important impact in youth 
movements throughout the world: the Vietnam war. 
Other factors pushed in the same direction. In the context of the 
international economic difficulties of the early seventies, and in 
particular as a result of the first energy crisis, European governments, 
many of which were are at that point under the control of social 
democratic parties, intensify the attention they pay to "Third World 
matters" . 
There were other, more particular, reasons for the increased attention 
that these European forces started to pay to Latin America in the context 
of their renewed attention to "Third World mattersn. Their emphasis on a 
kind of reformist welfare-statism seemed at that point to be domestically 
more viable in Latin America than in other areas of the underdeveloped 
world. This reflected the perception that some countries in the region 
were approaching the ranks of a "middle class of nations" , for which 
economic restrictions on reformism would be less acute. Even on purely 
economic grounds there were reasons for Latin America to attract European 
attention well beyond social democratic circles. The region was seen at 
the same time as a vast potential market, the most industrialize region of 
the developing world, an area rich in mineral and energy resources and 
apotential supply of relatively qualified but cheap labor. l1 And if all 
this was not enough, Latin America itself was committed to developing 
l1 Jenny Pearce "Introduction" to The Euro~ean Challenge : Euro~e ' s 
New Role in Latin America (London: Latin America Bureau, 1982). P. 6. 
alternative poles of relation beyond the Western hemisphere and, for 
reasons which are discussed in the next section of this essay considered 
the European social democrats as an attractive option. 
Three other factors contribute to draw the picture. The more general 
assertion of European interests during those years vis a vis the United 
States also contributed to the increase in reciprocal interest. The 
flexibility with which the International began to approach such thorny 
issues as the notion of political democracy members had to abide by 
certainly eased matters even more, in particular in relation to political 
parties which had their roots in populist movements seen in some cases by 
the European socialists as related to their own experiences with fascism. 
Finally, the important role that the Socialist parties of Spain and 
Portugal started to play in Socialist International circles after the fall 
of the last remnants of European fascism added a new element to the 
attention that Latin America could expect to receive in those same 
circles. 
In the early seventies all these developments had created a set of very 
favorable conditions for the rapprochement between European social 
democracy and those forces which one could associate with Latin America's 
"democratic left". The 1971-73 experience of the Popular Unity government 
in Chile was the final element needed to catalize that interest. Several 
aspects of that experience contributed to increase European social 
democratic interest in Latin America. Chile's "electoral road to 
socialism" had attracted the attention of socialist political forces 
worldwide practically from the moment of Allende's triumph. 
For the social democrats it assumed a particularly important meaning 
since it seemed to prove that peaceful processes of transition were 
possible even in less developed areas of the world. Since "la via chilena" 
openly aimed at not only reforming existing structures but at the 
"building of socialism" itself it also tended to capture the imagination 
of European political actors who perceived themselves as constrained by 
the political realities of their own countries to go "that far". The 
appeal of the Chilean experiment for these forces had several concrete 
expressions.Thus, the first time that the Bureau of the Socialist 
International met in Latin American soil took place in Santiago de Chile, 
during Feruary, 1973. 
The assasination of President Allende, the September 1973 coup and the 
levels that repression reached in the country in its wake galvanized the 
attention not only of European socialists but of wider segments of 
European and world public opinion. The Church Commission's U.S. Senate 
investigation on the role of the North American government in the de- 
estabilization of the Chilean government, in turn, increased the gap in 
the security perceptions of U.S. political elites and significant parts of 
the European political spectrum which saw many parts of the Chilean 
deposed coalition as their own. The words that America Ghioldi, exiled 
member of the Argentine Socialist Party, had used in his report on Latin 
America to the 1955 International Socialist Congress would find a more 
receptive audience almost 20 years later: "With pathetic blindness- he had 
stated- that great country [the United States C.R.], claiming strategic 
reasons has provided arms to dictators who use them against their own 
peoples. n 12 
In more than one sense, the fight against the Chilean military 
dictatorship supported by the United States would take on for a new 
generation of European socialists the flavor of something similar to the 
anti- fascist struggles that those social democratic militants who were 
themselves in charge of both the movement and their national parties by 
the early seventies had fought a quarter century before in their own 
countries. As other South American countries joined Chile in the road to 
authoritarianism the International's scope of attention on Latin America 
was widened. 
In the second half of the seventies Latin America was second only to 
Europe itself as the area where the S.I. had more contacts, and its 
importance increased in the agenda of a movement which declared itself 
committed to changing its well deserved eurocentric image. The last years 
of the decade witnessed a series of high level meetings between important 
leaders of the movement and their Latin American counterparts, as well as 
the extension of Latin American participation to such political forces as 
Mexico's PRI, Brazil's MDB and El Salvador's MNR. The elections in the 
Dominican Republic at the end of the decade provided the International 
with a first case in which the possibility of concrete actions beyond 
l2 As quoted in Felicity Williams: op. cit. P. 125. 
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declarations was validated. l3 
The XIV Congress of the International, held in Vancouver, Canada in 
November of 1978, represents the high water mark of the SI's Latin 
American involvement prior to the Central American crisis. Over twenty 
Latin American political parties and movements attended the Congress, 
among them the Sandinist Front of National ~iberati0n.l~ This in a sense 
symbolized the role that the sub-regional conflict would play as a key 
stimulus to those tendencies towards a greater European socialist 
involvement in Latin American issues that I have summarized. The crisis in 
fact became the new focus of European social democratic activities in the 
region during the eighties. Before examining the role of European social 
democrats in Central America, however I will present some of the factors 
which contributed, on the Latin American side to give those efforts a warm 
welcome. 
3.- Too high hoves? Latin American Expectations and Eurovean 
Social Democracv. 
Within Latin America's efforts at diversification Western Europe has 
l3 Pierre Schori: El desafio euroveo en CentroamBrica (San Jos6: 
Editorial Universitaria Centroamericana, 1982). Pages 251-254. 
l4 Nueva Sociedad, Num. 39, November/December 1979. P. 12 It is 
interesting to note that Granada's New Jewel Movement also requested 
admission in the International, and that it was accepted in 1980. Also in 
1980 a request for membership presented by Nicaragua's Movimiento 
Democratico Nicaraguense, headed by Alfonso Robelo, was denied. 
occupied a very important place. This is true in the economic- 
particularly regarding trade- realm, but even more so in the political 
one. This is a reflection, both of the perception that Latin American 
political elites have of themselves and their countries as belonging to 
Western culture and civilization and of an extremely important reality: 
the terms of political debate in the region have interesting parallels 
with those which dominate in Europe. The reception given to European 
social democratic activities in the area has to be framed in this 
context. 
Laurence Whitehead has pointed out how the differences between the U.S. 
government and the governments of Western Europe in terms of their 
"contrasting histories, their distinctive geopolitical roles, and their 
present differences of political structure ...g ive rise to marked 
variations of conduct and motive. "I5 Without trying to take the comparison 
too far it may be proposed that there are some key points in which the 
terms of political debate in both Europe and Latin America are at the same 
time less "exceptional" than those of the United States and more similar 
between them. Thus, in both cases there is both a tradition of more 
Burkean conservatism and an active presence of Marxism as an important 
component of the worldviews of important segments of their public debate. 
As a result of these factors it frequently &ems to be easier for Latin 
l5 Laurence Whitehead, "International Aspects of Democratization", in 
Guillermo OWDonnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence whitehead (Eds.) 
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Com~arative Pers~ectives (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). P. 10. 
Americans to interact with European political forces than with those of 
the United States or even of other regions which in fact may be seen as 
very important poles of relations in the economic sphere, such as Japan. 
There is one aspect of all this that is particularly relevant in 
connection to the attitudes of European social democrats in the Central 
American crisis. Even if social democratic parties have many times 
officially abandoned Marxism in their official declarations, the 
conceptual framework of this school of thought is not alien to the mind 
sets of many among their own militants. This many times helps in the 
development of a more understanding attitude vis a vis movements in other 
countries which may use that language in particular in comparison to the 
one which usually emanates from North American political elites. European 
social democrats seem to be better disposed to separate rethoric from 
reality in those cases, in particular if they do not involve their own 
former colonies. 
There are other reasons for the optimism with which European actions 
were received in "democratic left" circles in Latin America. The link 
between the lessening of East-West tensions in the early seventies and the 
increasing appeal of social democracy as an international movement is 
particularly important to note in the context of this essay. It is in fact 
interesting to point out that both detente and the renewed international 
activism of the Socialist International in "Third World affaairs" were 
closely tied to the same individual who played a key role in their 
launching, first as Foreign Minister and Chancellor of the German Federal 
Republic and, after 1976, as chairman of the Socialist International: 
Willy Brandt . l6 
The particular situation of Latin America in relation to both European 
decolonization and the East-West conflict gave a clearly dominant role to 
developments that took place in the second of those issue areas. After 
all, with the exception of some Caribbean islands and parts of Latin 
America's Atlantic coast which have been perceived both by international 
observers and by Latin Americans themselves as constituting separate 
realities, the problems associated with European colonization had been 
settled at a much earlier stage. This certainly helps the Europeans to 
maintain a more relaxed attitude in relation to events that take place in 
this area of the world rather than in their own spheres of immediate 
influence and its impact should not be discounted. 
-a 
In my opinion, however, more weight should be assigned to the easing of 
East-West tensions in the late sixties and early seventies. The bipolar 
realities of the postwar world had had a particularly peculiar impact on 
Latin America, where being a part of the Western world and the United 
States' "back yard" many times seemed to be the two sides of the same 
coin. This was, of course, particularly bothersome to those political 
forces which were at the same time committed to reform and national self- 
determination and committed to essentially capitalist development 
programs. Finding alternatives, economic and political, within the West 
became an increasing concern for them. And once the automatic allignement 
of European social democracy with the United States on most international 
l6 Pierre Shori, OD. cit. 
2 0 
issues crucial to the region was removed in the context of detente, it 
became increasingly attractive to those same forces. 
In addition, European economic presence was limited17 and in fact was 
seen more as an alternative to U.S. complete domination than as a threat 
to sovereignty or national control over economic resources. This tended to 
diminish the concerns that the previous history of European economic 
involvement in the area may have raised. As Jenny Pearce has put it: 
"Latin America's traditional economic and political dependence on the 
United States and the strong resentment this has created within the 
region, have encouraged many to look positively toward European 
involvement". l8 Thus, even if there were no differences in the substance 
of European activities in the region, the evaluation that Latin American 
elites made of them tended to emphasize their positive dimensions. But 
there were other factors involved in this welcome. 
There was a perception, for example, that the Europeans were more 
willing to accommodate Latin American concerns in key areas of interest to 
the region than the North Americans had proven to be. Some antecedents in 
this regard dated back to the early seventies and the economic 
negotiations which dominated North-South relations during those years. I 
l7 A good summary of the limited economic presence of key European 
countries in the region is presented in Esperanza Durdn: Euro~ean 
Interests in Latin America (London: The Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 1985). See also Sistema Econ6mico Latinoamericano: America Latina 
y la Comunidad Econ6mica E u ~ o D ~ ~ :  Problemas v Pers~ectivas (Caracas: Monte 
Avila Editores, 1983). 
l8 Jenny Pearce, OD. cit. P. 7. 
have already made a reference to the increased attention to "Third World 
issues" that the economic problems of the early seventies helped spark on 
the part of European social democrats. Looked at from the other side of 
the table, that participation raised some expectations, connected to the 
fact that some of the European governments who took a leading role in 
North-South negotiations, in particular the social democratic ones, 
adopted a conciliatory tone which clearly contrasted with the first 
responses of the Nixon and Ford administrations in the United States to 
the demands of the developing countries. That response raised Latin 
American expectations regarding the role that European social democrats 
could play in the region's efforts to attain a more balanced set of 
international connections. 
Some of the reasons behind that difference in European social 
democratic attitudes with respect to those held by U.S. elites are not 
difficult to point out. The kind of reformist welfare-statism promoted by 
the social democrats made them more pliable to demands for a "new 
international economic order" which dominated North-South discussions in 
the early seventies, taking the place that the struggle for decolonization 
had had before in that regard. In addition several of the social 
democratic parties governed over countries that had had a very limited 
colonial experience and carried less legacies from such a history. The 
role that the Northern European parties played in the global context of 
those negotiations can be related to this factor, for example. 
Latin America had played, through countries such as Brazil, Mexico and 
Venezuela an important role in such efforts and the compromising attitude 
taken by the most important European social democratic leaders in such 
fora as the Brandt Commission was well received in the region. 19 
A second area in which the perceptions of European social democrats 
seemed to clearly differ from those of U.S. political elites was related 
to the question of economic, social and political change in the area, and 
particularly to its sources and likely direction. European social 
democrats tended to give more emphasis to the nationalistic aspects of 
those struggles than their North American counterparts. Such differences 
are openly aired in a letter to Willy Brandt by swedish social democrat 
Olof Palme. That letter summarized the view of the "U.S. connection" in 
relation to the Chilean coup of the early seventies which came to prevail 
in social democratic circles, but clearly had wider implications: 
The United States seem unable to understand 
and face in a constructive fashion the process 
of liberation which is already underway in 
the Latin American subcontinent. The position 
taken by the Americans in relation to the 
struggle of the Latin American peoples for 
freedom is as narrowminded and myopic as the 
one they took in the cases of China and Vietnam 
with people like Mao Tse Tung and Ho Chi Minh. 
The United States always feel threatened when a 
poor people fights for its national and social 
liberation, but that liberation is both 
necessary and unavoidable. 20 
l9 Jacqueline Roddick and Philip OIBrien, "Europe and Latin America 
in the Eighties", in The Euro~ean Challenge ... 
20 Willy Brandt, Bruno Kreisky and Olof Palme: La Alternativa 
socialdem6crata (Barcelona: Blurne, 1977). P. 128. 
A third area of differing perceptions between the U.S. and European 
Social democrats tended to bring the latter nearer the viewpoints of the 
Latin American "democratic left". Its subject matter was the weight and 
interpretation which should be given to Soviet actions in connection to 
Third World instability. At least in part that disagreement reflected the 
different international roles of the different allies. European social 
democrats tended to take a "regionalist" view, while the U.S. government 
in a tendency that was reinforced as the Reagan administration started- 
favored a more "globalist" one. The basic differences between one and the 
other have been adequately summarized by Karel E. Vosskuler: 
the regional approach accepts and values 
the continuing diffusion of power, 
appreciates the unique nature of the various 
regional alignments, assumes rather limited 
objectives behind Soviet policies in most Third World 
areas, relies heavily upon diplomatic and economic 
initiatives, favours maximum dissociation from regional 
conflicts and relies rather more on multilateral 
diplomacy, particularly within the framework of the 
United Nations ... the globalist approach ... tends to 
situate Third World conflict in an East-West context, 
assumes global aspirations on the part of the Soviet 
leadership, relies heavily on military force, attaches 
great value to formal alliances and, at the same time, 
shows a preference for bilateral diplomacy. 21 
A last area in which Latin American and European perceptions would come 
close in the context of the Central American crisis was in turn related to 
the similar roles that the largest Latin American countries and some of 
their European counterparts played as "medium-powers" in international 
politics. This was particularly important in relation to the emphasis they 
21 Karel E. ~osskijhler, "The EEC and the USA: Differing Politico- 
Economic Approaches", in Christopher Stevens (Ed.): EEC and the Third 
World: A Survey, Vol 3: The Atlantic Rift (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1983). 
put on the value of international law and accepted principles of 
international behavior as constraining factors of superpower activity, a 
factor that would become particularly relevant as the "low intensity 
warfare" directed at the Sandinista regime heated uu in the mid-eighties. 
As can be seen, there were interesting antecedents to the position that 
European social democrats were to take in relation to the Central American 
crisis. The description of that position constitutes the focus of the next 
section of this essay. 
4.- Romancing the Revolution: Euro~ean Socialism and the Central 
American Crisis. 
There are some more specific elements of background to the kinds of 
positions taken by European social democrats in connection to the 
Sandinist revolution and, more generally, the Central American crisis. The 
first set is related to the fact itself that Central America is an area of 
the world were there are practically no European vital interests at stake. 
The second, in turn, to the initial response by parties affiliated to the 
Socialist International to the Cuban revolution in the late fifties. In 
that instance most of them reacted quite positively, even if with the 
increased radicalization of the process that initial enthusiasm tended to 
wane after 1961. Those social democratic forces which in Europe and 
elsewhere kept an open mind in relation to the Cuban revolution many times 
based their position on the perception that such process of radicalization 
and the growing ties that the Cuban revolution established with the Soviet 
block were the result of misguided policies on the part of the U.S. 
government. 
A final set of background elements which must be taken into account is 
related to the role that different Central American political actors and 
issues had played in the activities of the Socialist International even 
before the Sandinist revolution. I will call these "Central American 
elements of background". The difficult balances that European social 
democracy has had to maintain in the context of the crisis were in a sense 
announced by the kinds of connections it developed over the years in the 
sub - region. 
I have already mentioned the fact that Costa Rica's Liberaci6n 
Nacional had become an observer in the International as of 1966. The Costa 
Rican party had established a School of Political Education for young 
Latin American political leaders and union officials in 1959, which in 
1968 changed its name to Centro de Estudios Democraticos de America Latina 
and became increasingly linked to the West German social democratic 
foundation, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. LiberaciBn had become, even 
before the explosion of the Central American crisis, one of the most 
important Latin American associates of the International. 
A second Central American element of background is related to the 
political support that European social democrats gave to the anti-Somoza 
struggle in Nicaragua. During the late seventies the Somoza dictatorship 
in Nicaragua, along with the military regimes of Guatemala, had become 
preferred targets for the social democrats, who tended to see them as the 
worst examples of the mistaken policies that the U.S. was perceived as 
pursuing in Latin America as a whole. The XI11 Congress of the 
International which took place in late 1976 condemned human rights abuses 
in Guatemala and Nicaragua, as well as Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, the 
Dominican Republic, Paraguay and Uruguay. 
Nicaragua caught an increasing share of attention as the situation of 
that country deteriorated at the end of the decade. Venezuela's Accidn 
Democrdtica and Costa Rica's Liberacidn Nacional contributed to this focus 
on Nicaragua. During 1978 the Socialist International demanded the 
cessation of "all arms shipments for the Somocista forces, in particular 
those coming from the United States" and offered "the support of its 
member parties for those groups within Nicaragua which are resisting the 
Somoza government as well as immediate assistance to a succesor 
government in its task of reconstruction". 2 2 
A final Central American element of background makes reference to the 
fact that important figures of the Salvadoran democratic left, which after 
the disappointing performance of the first two military juntas created in 
that country after the October 1979 coup joined the armed insurgents, had 
22 Statements of the Secretary General of the organization, B. 
Carlsson made on the 13 and 21 of September of 1978 and reprodoced in 
Socialist Affairs, Num.6, 1978. p. 171. Quoted in Williams: OD. cit. Pages 
251 and 252. 
become by the late seventies formal officials of the organization.23 The 
incorporation of the MNR as an observer in the Socialist International, 
another point of contact between those components of the Salvadoran 
democratic left which joined the armed insurrection and European social 
democrats, has already been mentioned. 
With this series of factors as backdrop it is not surprising that 
European socialists were among the first international actors to rejoice 
in the Sandinist triumph and to offer material and political assistance to 
the Sandinist government; that the murders of Guatemalan oposition 
leaders, such as Manuel Colom Argueta, who had developed close ties to 
various European social democratic leaders reaffirmed their interest in 
the region; that some of them originally took a quite sympathetic view of 
the Salvadoran insurrection; or that, as the conflict between Costa Rica 
and Nicaragua became more open, they had to search for ways to balance 
their commitments in the area. 
Three different kinds of actors have played important roles in terms of 
European socialist presence in the Central American crisis: governments 
that at different points have been under the control of these political 
forces, political parties and, finally, the Socialist International 
itself. The social democratic forces of various European countries have 
23 Perhaps the most prominent case was that of Hector Oqueli, member 
of the Salvadoran MNR, who in the late seventies became a member of the 
Secretariat in charge of Latin American affairs. Mr. Oqueli is at present 
a prominent figure in El Salvador's Democratic Revolutionary Front, which 
along with the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front constitutes part 
of the armed oposition in that country: FDR-FMLN. 
tended to rely on each one of these channels in different degrees. 
Recounting all the instances of their activity in the ithsmus would be not 
only too lenghty but also unnecessary for the purposes of this essay. I 
will only recall some of the most important instances in order to 
illuminate the different security perceptions which these actors brought 
to bear in the context of the crisis. 
How far we are from the indifference of 1954 becomes quite clear when 
one focuses on the actions of European governments, in particular those 
under the control of social democratic parties, in the context of the 
present Central American conflict. Two types of activity deserve special 
attention. The first one is related to the different programs of 
assistance aimed at maintaining open the options of the Sandinist 
revolution and the Salvadoran insurgents. European socialist governments 
participated in the initial efforts to finance the reconstruction of the 
Nicaraguan economy after the revolution. The socialist government of 
France went so far as to provide the Sandinist regime with U.S.$ 15 
millions in arms. 24 
Social democrats were also among the primary moving forces in the 
launching of the dialogue started in San Jose, Costa Rica in September of 
1984 which led to a new program of economic assistance to Central America 
on the part of the European Economic Community. The levels of aid involved 
in that program are quite limited, and the economic relations that Central 
24 Walter LaFeber, "The Reagan Administration and Revolutions in 
Central America1' in Political Science Ouarterlv Spring 1984. P.lO. 
America maintains with the Europeans are not too different from those it 
has with the United States in qualitative terms, 25 but their political 
significance can not be overlooked. The program, for example, formally 
included Nicaragua, in open disagreement with U.S. preferences which at 
that point were clearly directed at isolating the Sandinist regime. 
The second area of governmental activity refers to more political kinds 
of support. The French socialist government was, again, particularly 
active in this respect in the early stages of the crisis. In this case an 
important example, not only for its own significance but also for the fact 
that it constitutes one of the most controversial instances of European- 
Latin American collaboration in the context of the crisis, is the joint 
communiqu6 which that government issued with its Mexican counterpart in 
August of 1981 regarding the civil war in El Salvador. In that communiqu6 
both governments gave the Salvadoran FDR-FMLN the status of 
"representative political forces" and asked that the frentes be a part to 
any attempt to solve the civil war in that country. This represented the 
high point in the participation of both the Mexican and the French 
governments in the Salvadoran conflict. It was criticized by several Latin 
American countries as intervention in the domestic affairs of that Central 
American country. But it also served as the starting point for a series 
of resolutions passed by the United Nations in the following years which 
called on the Salvadoran government to negotiate with the frentes. In 
1982, for example, the governments of France, Denmark, Greece and the 
25 Victor Bulmer-Thomas , "Relaciones Econ6micas Entre Centroamkrica y 
Europa Occidental", in Cuadernos Semestrales de Estados Unidos: 
perspectiva latinoamericana Num.18, Second semester of 1985. 
Netherlands sponsored one such resolution which called for talks before 
the elections scheduled for that same year. 26 
Other examples of French actions that represented significant 
departures of previous European attitudes in the area can also be pointed 
out. Thus, another significant instance for us, since it involved a 
reaction to U.S. activities in the area, was the offer made by President 
Mitterand to help the Nicaraguan government remove the mines that had been 
placed by the contras with the support of the intelligence services of the 
superpower in the Gulf of Fonseca. 
A final expression of disagreements at the governmental level between 
the European socialist government and their North American counterpart was 
related to the degree of support that the former gave to the process of 
Contadora, initiated in early 1983 by Colombia, Mexico, Panama and 
Venezuela as an alternative to the Reagan administration policies in 
Central A m e r i ~ a . ~ ~  As a result of such support, for example, the European 
governments have invited the Contadora governments to their meetings with 
the Central Americans aimed at the establishment of the program for 
economic cooperation referred to in previous pages. 
Not only the governments but also the parties and the International 
26 Frederick Tanner, "Un nuevo aspect0 en la solucidn del conflict0 
en America Central: Europa y Contadora", in Cuadernos Semestrales de 
Estados Unidos: ~ers~ectiva latinoamericana , Num. 18, second semester of 
1985. 
27 Frederick Tanner, OD. cit. 
itself have expressed their support for the Contadora process and 
provided, for example through the activities of the Ebert foundation, 
Western options for the Central American revolutionaries. But perhaps an 
even more interesting aspect of the activities of these other non- 
governmental actors is related to the role they have played in generating 
and making public alternative diagnoses and policy prescriptions to deal 
with the crisis. The most open differences with the U.S. interpretation of 
the roots and potential solutions to the Central American crisis came, in 
fact, to be presented at the level of party activity. Important political 
figures of European social democracy presented impassionate arguments for 
an alternative policy, which in some instances seemed to reflect a 
positive, and almost idealized, view of the revolutionary processes that 
were taking place in the region. 
A case in point is that of Swedish Foreign Minister Pierre Schori's 
book El desafio euroDeo en Centr~amBrica,~~ published in Sweden in 1981 
and in Costa Rica the following year. Shori presents basic themes that 
will dominate European social democratic visions of the crisis during its 
early years in some of the clearest language ever used by these political 
forces. A first component of the vision he presents is an awareness of the 
historical roots of present conflicts and of the role on nationalism and 
national liberation in them. "The history of the Caribbean- he states 
early in his book- is the history of the fight of the empires against the 
peoples of the region, as well as of the internal drive of those empires 
to eliminate one another. But it is also the history of the struggle of 
28 Pierre Schori OD. cit. 
3 2 
the Caribbean natives to liberate themselves from their foreign 
This emphasis on nationalism and its impact on the Central 
American revolutions will repeat itself, in very different tbnes in 
practically all important statements that European social democrats will 
make in relation to the crisis. 30 Shori, however, goes farther than most 
of those statements in linking the historical past of the region to 
present problems. Thus, he finishes his first chapter with a series of 
statements which could have come from forces much further to the left in 
the political spectrum of either Europe or Central America: 
Empire builders of the modern age seem to have 
inherited many of the prejudices of the first 
colonialists. They consider Latin Americans as 
unable to determine their own destiny. They 
firmly maintain that any effort of political 
and economic emancipation feeds on foreign 
countries and ideologies and that, as a result, 
it is necessary to save these nations for the 
"free world", even if this has to be done against 
their will and by the force of arms. This is, in 
great measure what puts the peoples of Central 
America today in the eye of the storm. 3 1 
Throughout the book the references to the U.S. as the main obstacle to 
the self determination of Central America and one of the main components 
of the present crisis are almost permanent. It is in fact difficult to 
choose quotes. What follows is almost a random selection: 
29 Ibid. P.14. 
30 See, for example, Fernando MorAn, "Europe's Role in Central 
America: A Spanish Socialist View", in Andrew J. Pierre (Ed.): Third World 
Instability: Central America as a Euro~ean American Issue (New York: 
Council on Foreign Relations, 1985). 
31 Shori: OD. cit. P.21. 
In those cases where the national puppets have 
not been able to repress popular reivindications 
for reform the new colonial power has not 
vacillated in intervening directly. We saw it in 
Guatemala in 1954 and we are seeing it this year 
in El Salvador. 32 
The revolutionaries found much inspiration in the 
rebels of previous generations. But the main motor 
for their actions was, of course, the situation of 
their own country and not the result of opinions 
imported from Moscow or Havana. On the other hand, 
measures and decisions taken in the United States, 
the big neighbor of the Central Americans, have an 
immense role. 33 
The shark has eaten many sardines throughout the 
years. In the history of the U.S. Marine corps 
180 cases of intervention between 1800 and 1934 
are mentioned. . . 34 
... communism is not and has never been an 
important force in Latin America ... in practice only 
a reactionary policy on the part of the United 
States can create possibilities for communism ... 
History clearly shows that Latin America's struggle 
for liberation is not an extension of the East-West 
confrontation. The majority of the peoples of 
Central America do not know and are not likely to 
want any communism. They want today what the 
wanted seventy years ago: land and liberty. 33 
When are they going to understand that the 
identification with the most reactionary regimes 
of Latin America is counterproductive and that 
a sustainable anti-Soviet strategy requires an 
attempt to lay bridges to governments which 
32 Ibid. P. 28. 
33 Ibid. P. 37. 
34 Ibid. P.43. 
35 Ibid. P. 94-95. 
have popular support? 3 6 
The tone itself of such statements is interesting. It is hard to find 
the same kind of language in other European social democratic statements 
and it is doubtful that many among them would endorse the language used. 
But the open contradiction that they announce with the interpretations of 
the sources of instability that the Reagan administration brought to bear 
in the conflict was widely shared in those  circle^.^' It is easy to see 
why the basic assumptions of the initial public statements of the U.S. 
government, which tended to put the blame for the conflict on Soviet-Cuban 
activities, was seen by European social democratic forces not only as 
unrealistic but also as self-serving. And without accepting that basic 
diagnose of the roots of crisis in Central America it was very difficult 
for them to share the prescriptions proposed to deal with it. The emphasis 
on military measures was thought to be misguided since it did not address 
the real sources of the conflict; isolating Nicaragua was perceived as 
short sighted, since that country was not seen as already a part of the 
Soviet camp and as a result the best way to avoid that result was to keep 
its options open within the west,38 etc. 
36 Ibid. P. 210. 
37 See, for example, the text of a document prepared under the 
auspices of German and Dutch social democrats which was to be endorsed by 
most European social democratic parlamentarians: The Central American 
Crisis: A Euro~ean Res~onse (Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 1984). 
See also the critique of the Kissinger report presented by two influential 
members of the British Parliament in Stuart Holland and Donald Anderson: 
Kissin~er's KinEdom: A Counter Re~ort on Central America (London: 
Spokesman, 1984). 
38 Ibid. P. 11. 
It must be stressed that these were points spoused not only by the left 
wing of the movement. They represented a much wider consensus which in 
fact went beyond the social democratic ranks in Europe. A final point 
which made them all the more relevant for the topic of this essay was that 
they represented disagreements with the U.S. government over means rather 
than policy objectives. Wolf Grabendorff has adequately summarized the 
complex mix of basic agreement in terms of the aims to be pursued and 
disagreement on the best means to do achieve them that has characterized 
the security perceptions of European social democrats, on the one hand, 
and the Reagan administration, on the other. According to him, there is a 
basic agreement among most European political forces their North 
American counterparts in relation to the following interests: 
- to prevent the Central American countries from adhering to 
the socialist bloc 
- to avoid regional and internal instability due to 
interstate or intrastate violence 
- to guarantee economic cooperation through the support of 
free market economies 
- to further economic development and social justice through 
bilateral and multilateral aid programs39 
These shared interests, however, do not change the basic reality that 
there are significant disagreements on the diagnoses of the crisis 
39 Wolf Grabendorff, "Western European Perceptions of the Crisis in 
Central America", in Wolf Grabendorff, Heinrich-W. Krumwiede and Jorg 
Todt: Political Change in Central America: Internal and External 
Dimensions (Boulder: Westview, 1984). P. 289. 
preferred by these partners in the Atlantic Alliance. From the European 
social democratic view the crisis is best characterized as 
- a north-south problem in and of the Western Hemisphere; 
- a problem deeply rooted in the historical relationship of 
the United States with its southern neighbors; 
- a test case for the United States to come to terms with 
the solution of its informal empire; 
- a test case for the Western powers to deal with 
revolutionary change and self-determination in the Third 
World; 
- a problem of how to restrain the military engagement of 
the Soviet Union and/or radical Third World states; 
- a problem of how to avoid a superpower confrontation in 
the region and the resulting spillovers. 40 
As I have emphasized earlier in this essay, those different diagnoses 
in turn lead to different emphases in terms of policy prescriptions. A 
comparison of those proposals advanced by the European social democrats 
with the policy preferences of the largest Latin American governments41 
makes it very clear that they shared precisely those crucial points in 
which they in turn disagreed with the North American government. During 
the first few years of the Central American crisis European social 
democrats seemed to be going in a direction which could satisfy the 
expectations placed in them by many Latin American political actors. They 
certainly contributed during those years to the basic Latin American 
40 Wolf Grabendorff, "The Central American Crisis: Is there a Role 
for Western Europe?" in Joseph Cirincione (Ed.): Central America and the 
Western Alliance (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985). P. 129. 
41 See, for example, Carlos Rico, OD. cit. 
objective of avoiding a situation in which the crisis could be placed in a 
strict East-West context. After 1982, however, a perceptible change took 
place in the Central American activities of the European social democrats 
which cast severe doubts on the realism of those hopes. My concluding 
remarks touch on these final topics. 
5.- Final Considerations. 
The high point of European social democratic interest in the Central 
American crisis lasted a little more than three years. After 1982 a new 
period was opened during which a gradual disentanglement on their part 
was in progress. European attention was renewed with the efforts at 
developing a program of economic cooperation launched with the San Jose 
meeting of September of 1984. 42 Such attention, however, had important 
differences with the initial period of Western European commitment. It was 
a governmental enterprise which included all governments of the EEC rather 
than only those under social democratic control. Social democratic forces 
themselves took an increasingly restrained attitude. The Spanish socialist 
government, in particular, seemed constrained by an apparent desire to 
keep good working relations with all its former colonies in the isthmus, 
which brought it to a conscious effort not to "take sides" in the 
conflict. Little by little the Nordic socialists became the most important 
Western European alternatives for the Sandinist government and the 
revolutionary movement in El Salvador. 
42 Jose Miguel Insulza, "Europa, Centroamerica y la Alianza 
Atlbntican, in Cuadernos Semestrales de Estados Unidos: ~ers~ectiva 
latinoamericana, Num 18, second semester of 1985. 
There are several resons for such a shift. They have to do with changes 
in European politics, the activities undertaken by other governments in 
relation to the conflict and the development of the Central American 
crisis itself. Among the most important of the first set of changes was 
the consolidation of Conservative rule in two important Western European 
countries, Germany and Great Britain, and the increasing problems of the 
Socialists in France. The first two were among the first European members 
of the Atlantic Alliance to change their original policy of providing 
options to the Sandinist regime within the West. In that sense, at least 
part of the restraint exhibited after 1984 by the European social 
democratic governments reflected the nature itself of the multilateral 
exercise in which all of them participated starting that year. 
The French were a good example of another interesting set of 
circumstances: just as their relative lack of vital interests in Central 
America had given them a freer hand to act in more "progressive" ways than 
was the case in their own former colonies, it also made them less likely 
to pay the price implied by opposition to the policy in their own country 
and on the part of the U.S. government. Complicating matters in either one 
of those arenas as a result of policies adopted in connection with a 
relatively secondary issue in their agenda seemed unnecessary. 
This brings us to our second set of developments. Actions by both the 
United States government and those of Latin American countries in the 
immediate vicinity of the conflict were important in limiting the 
commitment of European social democrats. As regards the first one, the 
displeasure of conservative North American thinkers with the activities of 
the Western European socialists in connection with the Central American 
crisis43 was not a secret, even at the beginning of the Reagan 
administration. The Administration itself gave clear signs of concern. In 
February 1981 Ambassador Eagleburger visited the main Western European 
capitals in an effort to sell the U.S. government's views on the crisis. 
The following year a National Security Council memorandum was leaked to 
the North American press in which the effort to change the attitudes of 
the Socialist International in connection to the Central American crisis 
was presented as one of the key priorities in the Administration's Central 
American agenda. As the priority assigned by the Reagan administration to 
the sub-regional conflict became increasingly clear the perception of 
potential costs to be paid by those forces that insisted on developing 
alternative policies also grew. 
It is of course very difficult, with the information available in 
public sources at this point, to prove any instances of open pressure on 
these government or political groups or to establish clear lines of 
causality between their changes of behavior and U.S. displeasure. But that 
both such displeasure and the U.S. government's intention to correct its 
sources were well known to the parties involved is difficult to deny. 
Taking a more relaxed attitude on the part of Western Europe's 
43 See, for example, Irving Kristol, "Should Europe be Concerned 
About Central America?", in Andrew J. Pierre (Ed.): OD. cit. 
political forces was made easier as a consequence of the actions of those 
Latin American governments that became identified as the "Contadora 
group". In a sense, the existence of the Latin American effort and the 
commitment of key Latin American countries to sustaining it made it 
relatively easier for the European governments to simply transform their 
own efforts into support for the regional initiative. And, as with many 
other such instances of formal support many times its concrete expressions 
were quite limited. 
As regards the evolution of the Central American crisis itself, two 
developments seem particularly relevant. The first one was the increased 
Soviet support for the Nicaraguan revolution and the radicalization of the 
process itself. As had been the case with the Cuban revolution, many 
social democrats saw both as almost inevitable results of the pressure put 
on the revolutionary regime by the U.S. But whatever its causes the 
result itself, with all its implications, remained. And even as some 
social democrats still struggled to keep some space open for the 
Nicaraguans, the more open changes of other European governments 
significantly changed the context in which their alternative policies had 
to be pursued. 
The attitudes of other European political forces- in this case the 
Christian democratic parties of key countries such as, again, Germany- 
were also particularly relevant in the context of the second Central 
American development: the seeming consolidation of the Duarte government 
in El Salvador. 
But whatever the reasons for the dampening of European social 
democratic activities in Central America, their apparent restraint brought 
about a clear sobering of Latin American expectations regarding their 
potential role as counterweights of U.S. presence in the sub-region at the 
political level. Such revision of previous hopes has centered on two kinds 
of considerations. In the first place, the already mentioned limited 
extent of their economic commitment, in particular when compared with the 
kinds of resources that the Reagan Administration has been willing to 
involve in support of its own policy preferences. Secondly, the 
increasingly critical tone of the evaluation that many of those social 
democratic parties have tended to make of the internal politics of the 
Nicaraguan revolution, which do not seem to take into account the national 
emergency created for that country by the low intensity warfare directed 
from Washington. It would seem as if these European political forces were 
consciously or unconsciously playing into the hands of precisely one of 
the objectives of such strategy -to bring about an increase in Nicaragua's 
international isolation. Such critical tone increased with the failure of 
the efforts undertaken during the 1984 Rio de Janeiro meeting of the 
International to bring the Sandinists and then contra leader Arturo Cruz 
to agree on terms that would guarantee the latter's participation in the 
Nicaraguan electoral process of that same year. 
Two final elements must be included in the evaluation of the European 
social democratic retreat. The first one points to the fact that the 
Central American revolutionary forces still enjoy the sympathy of 
important segments of European social democratic constituencies, as the 
reception given to the Nicaraguan President and Vice-President in their 
European tours amply shows. As a result of this, even if they limit their 
support of the Sandinist revolution they still can not publicly support 
the policies pursued by the Reagan administration. This in turn is 
important for those forces which oppose them within the U. S. and which can 
point to European disagreements as one proof of their mistaken nature. In 
a sense, we seem to face a "juego a cuatro bandas" in which European 
public opinion support limits the public statements of their governments, 
which in turn affects the domestic North American political debate in ways 
which limit the North American administration's ability to act in 
accordance with its own preferences. 
The second point which must be included in our evaluation is in turn 
related to the changing political circumstances of key South American 
countries where four factors that were touched on in previous sections of 
this essay may help to bring a renewed European social democratic presence 
in that part of the continent. First, there is a stronger tradition of 
both social democratic and European presence in South America than is the 
case in the ithsmus. Secondly, European economic and other interests 
involved in that part of the world are considerably more important. Third, 
significant sectors of those countries' left have tended to move in an 
increasingly social democratic direction. Finally, the United States seem 
to be willing to tolerate a greater degree of "heterodox" behavior there 
than seems to be the case in what it clearly still considers its own 
Mediterranean. 
Part I1 of the History of the Renewed Presence of European Social 
Democracy in Latin America, in sum, may have to be written from a Southern 
Cone perspective, now that Part I seems to have ended in a clearly anti- 
climactic note . . . p  erhaps the story will include more adventurous turns in 
that second installment. 
